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The Court rules as follows:
The parties and their arguments were heard in public
session and their statements have been examined.
1.
By petition deposited on 15 February 2007, the claimant
has appealed the decisions of 25 March 2005 and 24
November 2006 of the 3rd chamber of the Commercial
Court of Kortrijk (AR. A/2821/04). The latest decision
was served on the claimant on 17 January 2007.
Facts and procedure of first instance
2.
Pepijn DESCAMPS (hereinafter ‘defendant’) acted as a
consultant to bvba CSWARE, an IT company that
manages systems and networks for companies
(hereinafter ‘claimant’), of which he was a partner at the
time.
By summons served on 6 July 2004, the defendant
[claimant in the procedure of first instance] demanded
the payment by claimant of ten invoices and/or bills,
diminished by the amount of two invoices he owed the
claimant, or, the payment of: 13.633,86 EUR (principal
sum) + 416,32 EUR (9,5% agreed interest) + 1.363,39
EUR (10% damage clause) = 15.413,57 EUR.
The claimant demanded by counterclaim the payment
by the defendant of the two invoices (of which the
defendant recognizes he owed them) for a total sum of
3.297, 35 EUR (principal sum), plus 12% agreed interest
and plus 10% damage clause (329,73 EUR).
The claimant claims it was agreed on 25 October 2003
that she would only accept invoices of which she had
approved and signed on the order form in advance. She
also states she informed the defendant (who contests
this) of this by e-mail.
Furthermore, the claimant states she objected to
every one of these invoices by e-mail.
The defendant claims he never received the e-mails
and states such documents can easily be produced after
the event by anyone with sufficient technical
knowledge.
By interlocutory judgment of 25 March 2005, the first
judge sustained both the claim and the counterclaim.
Before ruling on the merits of the case, the judge
appointed engineer Philippe WUYLENS as an expert. He
had to determine the true nature of the creation, the
sending and the receipt of the relevant e-mails.
The final report of the expert was deposited at the
court registry on 26 October 2005.
By final judgment of 24 November 2006, the first
judge accepted the claim and ordered the claimant to
pay to the defendant the following sums: 15.413,57
EUR, 9,5% judicial interest per year on the amount of
13.633,86 EUR and the legal interest on 1.363,39 EUR,
all to be calculated from the day of summons until the
day of payment. The defendant also had to pay the
costs of the proceedings and her counterclaim was
ruled to be unfounded.
Procedure of appeal
3.
The defendant in the first instance procedure (the
claimant in this procedure) appealed the decision. The
claimant states the alleged manipulation of her e-mails
is not proven, which entails their evidence still stands.
Fraud must be proven. In a subsidiary order, she
requests permission to order witnesses and/or the
parties to appear in court.
The defendant requests that the judgments of the
court of first instance to be upheld.
Detailed statements of the complaints and arguments
of the parties can be found in the appeal and the
conclusions.
Evaluation
4.
The expert was asked if the e-mails, which are of vital
importance for the judgment of this case, were actually
sent to the defendant via internal company mail, if they
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reached him and if he read them.
The expert concluded as follows in his report:
‘The e-mail system of the defendant (claimant in this
procedure) is an internal system that does not route
e-mails through the internet (world wide web) and
thus functions without being controlled by an
independent internet service provider.’ (page 4, point
4a);
‘The defendant is the system administrator to her
own mail server. This implies that she has unlimited
access to the mailboxes and properties of all e-mail
users. This means she can log on to the e-mail
system using another name (e.g. the name of the
claimant) and can act as she wishes using another
name… In other words, the internal concept of the e-
mail system of the defendant does not allow the
conclusion with technical certainty that the claimant
did receive and read the e-mails.’ (page 5, point b
and page 7, conclusions 6a and 6b);
‘In theory, it would be possible for the defendant, in
her capacity of system administrator, to manipulate
the clock of the server and thus send e-mails with a
forged date, possibly using another name. A simple
command can randomly set the clock of a computer
and for example antedate the clock. From a practical
point of view, this will be less easy because the
system clock of the e-mail server applies to all e-
mails of the system, which implies date of all e-mails
would be changed.’ (page 5, point d and page 7,
conclusion 6c);.
If the claimant claims she sent certain e-mails to the
defendant in which it was ‘agreed’ that she would only
accept invoices of which she had approved and signed
the order form in advance, or in which she objected to
the invoices and bills, it is for her to prove she did send
them.
As did the first judge, the Court concludes from the
expert report that the claimant fails to deliver this proof.
The print-outs presented of the e-mails have no
evidential value (exhibit 1 to 4 of the claimant).
5.
This judgement is even strengthened by the following:
Apparently, Mr Tjerk BEKE, a colleague of the
defendant, also never received similar e-mails
supposedly sent by the claimant (exhibit 24 of the
defendant).
Also, certain invoices and bills of the period October
2003-January 2004 (after the alleged e-mail of 25
October 2003), were paid by the claimant without
reservation, even though she had not approved and
signed order forms for these invoices and bills in
advance (exhibits 16 to 22 of the defendant).
Finally, the claimant never spoke of the e-mail
confirming the agreement and the e-mails in which she
supposedly objected to the invoices (exhibits 1 to 4 of
the claimant) until after she received the summons.
6.
The final invoices (exhibits 2 to 5 of the defendant) and
bills (exhibits 8 to 13 of the defendant) of the defendant
were never paid. The claimant does not prove that she,
as a trader, objected to the invoices in time, not even
after being served two formal notices on 21 April 2004
and 9 June 2004 (exhibits 14-15 of the defendant).
The defendant presented his invoice book which
shows the invoices were regularly recorded, on their
specific dates (exhibit 27 of the defendant). The bills did
not have to be included in the accounting since they
only concerned the reimbursement of established costs
that had been advanced by the defendant (exhibits 28
and 31 of the defendant).
The claimant mistakenly states that the burden of
proof concerning the alleged manipulation of the e-
mails lies with the defendant. It is, on the contrary, for
the claimant to prove her ‘agreements’ and ‘objections’
by establishing with certainty the creation, sending and
receipt of the e-mails.
The Court considers no further measures of
investigation are necessary, since an expert (who also
talked to all persons involved and examined the system)
has already analysed this question thoroughly.
By lack of proven objections to the invoices and bills,
the original claim of the defendant is considered to be
legitimate. The judgment of the Court of First Instance is
upheld.
FOR THESE REASONS
THE COURT
Ruling on the inter partes procedure;
Considering article 24 of the Act of 15 June 1935
concerning the use of language in court;
Finds the appeal to be admissible, but unfounded;
Upholds the appealed judgments;
Sentences the claimant to pay the costs of the appeal
proceedings, settled on 1.100,00 EUR (Royal Decree 26
October 2007);
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Ruled and judged in the public session of the Ghent
Court of Appeal, Chamber 7bis, Civil affairs, of 10 March
2008.
Present:
Frank DESCHOOLMEESTER, Judge
Frank JODTS, Clerk
Précis and commentary 
E-mail – Evidential value and force – Electronic signature
If the authenticity of an e-mail is contested, it is for
the party invoking the e-mail to prove its authenticity.
An e-mail sent through an internal e-mail system that is
under the control of the sender and does not route e-
mails over the public internet, cannot be used as proof
by the sender of the e-mail.
Facts
Mr Descamps acted as a consultant to CSWARE, an IT
company that manages systems and networks. When
CSWARE stopped paying for his services, Mr Descamps
demanded the payment of ten outstanding invoices and
bills. CSWARE, however, claimed both parties agreed in
October 2003 that CSWARE would only accept invoices
that had been approved by it in advance. CSWARE
stated it informed Mr Descamps of this by e-mail and
also claimed it objected to every invoice dated after
October 2003.
To prove its claims, CSWARE presented printouts of
the relevant e-mails to the court. Mr Descamps,
however, argued he never received any of the e-mails,
and pointed out that the e-mails could easily have been
produced after the event by anyone with sufficient
technical knowledge. 
Internal e-mail system
The Court of First Instance appointed an expert to
determine the true nature of the contested e-mails and
to investigate whether or not, how and when the e-mails
had been sent and received. The expert found that
CSWARE used an internal e-mail system that did not
route internal e-mails over the public internet.
Consequently, internal e-mails never passed the servers
of an independent internet service provider and never
left a reliable audit trail. Moreover, CSWARE
administered the e-mail server itself, and therefore had
access to the mailboxes of all users.
This system setup enabled CSWARE, in its capacity of
system administrator, to manipulate the clock of the
server and to send out e-mails with forged dates,
possibly even under another name, should it wish to.
Taking into account the architecture of the internal e-
mail system and the possibility of manipulation, the
expert stated there was no certainty as to whether or
not Mr Descamps did in fact receive and read the
alleged e-mails regarding the prior approval of invoices.
Decisions
The Court of First Instance followed the reasoning of the
expert and ruled in favour of Mr Descamps. CSWARE
appealed this verdict on the grounds that the alleged
manipulation of the e-mails was never proved, and that
their evidential value would thus still stand.
The Court of Appeal confirmed, however, that the
burden of proof was with CSWARE, and that CSWARE
needed to prove it did in fact send the e-mails. The
Court of Appeal did not accept the simple print-outs of
the e-mails as evidence, also taking into account the
fact that a colleague of Mr Descamps never received
similar e-mails purportedly sent by CSWARE.
Furthermore, some invoices and bills from the period
October 2003 – January 2004 had been paid by
CSWARE, even though no order forms had been issued
and signed previously. The Court also noted that
CSWARE never mentioned the e-mails until after it
received the summons. The Court of Appeal therefore
confirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
Consequences
Both decisions concern the evidential value and force of
e-mails. Following EU legislation in this field (Directive
1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community
framework for electronic signatures, OJ L 13, 19.01.2000,
p.12), Belgium introduced several laws on electronic
signatures in 2000. In short, these laws hold that a
court can accept any type of electronic signature
(provided it can be uniquely linked to the signatory and
demonstrates the integrity of the document), and must
accept certain advanced (‘qualified’) types of electronic
signatures. The evidential force of such qualified
electronic signatures (often digital signatures) is equal
to the evidential force of traditional, handwritten
signatures. The electronic signature laws are
accompanied by the national provision of electronic
identity cards, enabling every Belgian citizen to sign
documents with a qualified electronic signature. Digital
signature schemes can also be provided by third party
providers.
Although the system of electronic signatures is legally
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sound, qualified electronic signatures are not yet
frequently used in Belgian legal practice. They are often
found to be too complex and too difficult to use, leading
to a ‘chicken-and-egg’ situation where providers wait for
users to adopt them to develop products and services,
and customers wait for a wide availability of products
and services to effectively use qualified electronic
signatures. So far, qualified electronic signatures are
mainly found in specific, controlled environments,
although promising trials indicate that their use may
increase in the future.1
Even though qualified electronic signatures are not
often used yet, the evidential value of  e-mails, not
signed with such a signature, is not generally found to
be problematic in Belgian legal practice. Belgian courts
generally accept regular (printed) e-mails as evidence,
unless a party invokes its alleged invalidity. An example
is a 2003 decision of the Ghent Labour Court of Appeal,
which held that a regular e-mail with no qualified
electronic signature can be used to prove a contract
when no formally signed contract was available.2
The two decisions discussed above constitute an
interesting illustration of this legal practice. Belgian
courts generally accept e-mails without qualified
electronic signatures, provided it can be reasonably
proved that the e-mail was effectively sent by the
alleged sender, and that the content has not been
tampered with. Internal e-mail systems might not meet
these criteria, as they might be easily manipulated by
their administrators, depending on the architecture of
the system.
The legal argument would have been even more
interesting should the contested e-mail have been sent
using public e-mail servers that are under the control of
a third party (such as an internet access provider).
In light of the technical nature of regular e-mail
systems, it can be expected that additional cases will
arise in the future, where courts require a party to
deliver the difficult prove that a contested e-mail has
effectively been sent and that its content has not been
forged. Given a critical amount of such cases, the merits
of the current cases may lie in the fact that they spur
companies to adopt electronic signatures and
accompanying features, such as digital certificates and
trusted timestamps.
Translation and commentary © Patrick Van Eecke and
Elisabeth Verbrugge, 2008
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1 See http://www.fedict.be for an overview of trials
and examples of use.
2 Ghent Labour Court of Appeal (Bruges department,
7th chamber), 23 September 2003, Journal des
tribunaux de travail, Volume 893, 2004, p. 334.
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